Jimmy Johns sales were almost twice Subway.

http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/story/2012-01-12/burger-king-delivery/52604104/1

At first I thought Burger King delivery was a dumb idea.  But, after thinking about it a while, it may prove to be a smart move – in the right locations and for the right premium.

Burger King is using custom packaging for the fries that won’t trap steam to make them soggy, but it will trap the emitted heat.  The delivery bags probably have a heating element too.

I could see delivery being a surprise hit with customers. There no reason pizza should be the only popular delivery food.  Jimmy Johns owes a lot of its success to delivery.

Taco John’s, a “West-Mex” fusion fast food restaurant, held voluntary workshops in most of its territories for franchisees to learn ways to reduce their food and labor costs with a goal of 1% reduction. They were in the form of interactive round tables and discussion about how to streamline operations, and there was lots of networking between unit manager.  Also discussed were ways to better advertise locally.

It sounds like a great way to reach out to franchisees.  Hopefully it will help.

Here is a partial list of franchisors that have filed bankruptcy, or are reported near filing bankruptcy recently.

• Perkins
• Marie Callender’s
• Old Country Buffet
• Real Mex Restaurants
• Giordano’s
• Cork and Olive
• Dial-a-Mattress
• Bally Total Fitness
• Friendly’s
• Souper Salad
• Sbarro
• Dippin’ Dots
• The Little Gym
• Fatburger (A little controversial -Fatburger parent company not part of bankruptcy, but the two subsidiaries accounted for 72% its total revenue in 2008. The bankruptcy came under pressure from G.E. Capital Business Asset Funding, which Fatburger owed $3.9 million for defaulted loans.)
• Mrs. Fields / TCBY

A bit older bankruptcies.  It shows that some brands can recover quite well, especially Denny’s, Day’s Inn, 7-Eleven and Church’s Chicken:

• Bennigan’s – 2008
• Baker’s Square – 2008
• Roadhouse Grill – 2007
• Ground Round -2004
• Boston Market – 1998
• Denny’s – 1997
• Church’s Chicken – 1991
• Sizzler’s – 1996
• Krystal – 1995
• Day’s Inn – 1990
• 7-Eleven – 1990

What a sad story. Giordano’s is a leader and well-known institution in Chicago’s stuffed crust pizza game. It owns 10 corporate  stores and manages 35 franchised locations in Illinois and Florida.  Somehow this chain, where people (often tourists) stand in long line for an overrated $20 deep dish pizza, owed $45 million to a lender and had to file bankruptcy in February when it stopped paying back a note. Bidders for the company include the parent companies of Gino’s East and Connies Pizza.

It sounds like they over-leveraged their real estate acquisitions and didn’t have enough income for debt coverage.

Giordano’s was acquired by VPC Capital Partners in Chicago for $52 million.  It’s chairman, Richard Levy, hopes to elegantly apply his legal, bio-pharmaceutical, and energy background into the pizza industry, an obviously natural next step for him and sure to reassure franchisees.  Luckily, the Giordano’s family is going to stick around and collect big salaries to help out.   Don’t the new owners look happy in this picture (pic courtesy of Chicago Tribune) to the right?   They have BIG plans for the brand, hoping to clone the success of Paul Newman’s $200 million grocery business including developing a line of products for grocery stores “similar to what Paul Newman has done for salad dressing” and expanding the restaurant footprint beyond its Chicago and Florida markets.

Cheese

Average block cheese prices continued to drop last week on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, averaging $1.77 from $1.81 the previous week.

Cheese reached its 3-month high of $2 on Nov. 15, but continues to drop on slowing demand.

Wheat

Wheat prices fell again last week on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, averaging $8.43 from $8.54 the previous week. Two weeks ago, wheat was as high as $9.26. The current multi-month low is the result of a larger-than-expected grain output from China, and a positive jobs report from the U.S.

Pizza company stocks

Pizza stocks were boosted by lowering commodity prices and an upward trending stock market the past week.

Pizza Hut parent Yum! Brands Inc. closed last week at $56.25, up nearly $4 from the previous week, which closed at $52.72. The company hit its 52-week high in August when shares were $56.72. Yum! traded as low as $46.40 in January.

Domino’s closed last Friday at $33.56 up from $30.51 the previous week. DPZ hit its 52-week high earlier in the day on Friday, trading at $33.81. Shares remain substantially higher over this time last year when the company traded at $14.72. The company has a P/E ratio of 30.8, above the average leisure industry P/E ratio of 22.4 and above the S&P 500 P/E ratio of 17.7

Papa John’s closed last week at $37.25, up from $35.50 the previous week. PZZA hit its 52-week high earlier in the week, at $38.18. PZZA’s 52-week low was last December when it traded at $25.83.

CEC Entertainment Inc., parent company of Chuck E. Cheese restaurants, closed out last week at $33.17, up from $32.35 the previous Friday. CEC hit its 52-week low of $27.42 in September. The company hit its 52-week high of $41.75 in July.

Pizza Inn closed at $6.28 Friday after hitting a new 52-week high of $6.60 earlier in the day. The company closed at $5.30 last Friday. PZZI traded as low as $1.88 in November 2010. Domestic same-store sales increased 2.7 percent for the first fiscal quarter compared to the prior fiscal year driven by a 3.2 percent increase in same-store sales for the buffet-style concept.

Most notable, and what I find most interesting, is the success of their new “Pie Five” concept. Pie Five offers 9′ pizzas for $6.50 baked in 5 minutes, with a target demographic of mid-to-upper income. In the first quarter of 2011, the first Pie Five Pizza Company generated $230,000 in sales and $50,000 in operating income before taxes.

I didn’t see this one coming. Planet Smoothie is solid brand with a loyal customer base. I hope Planet Smoothie received a significant premium in this acquisition by Tasti D-Lite, and the existing franchisees have some protections. Tasti D-Lite was acquired by a private equity firm in 2007 majority owned by Jim Amos, who promptly appointed himself CEO after the acquisition. Amos was formerly CEO of Mail Boxes Etc before selling to UPS, former CEO of Sona MedSpa and I Can’t Believe It’s Yogurt. I don’t know Amos personally, but from what I have heard he is a classic promoter. He’s likable and has the right persona for a CEO. But, from what I hear he runs his mouth too much and gets into trouble confidently over-promising results and being extremely difficult with existing franchisees. He’s good as selling franchises and controlling the franchisor’s cash flow. He’s had to settle out of court in a dishonesty-related law suits in his previous CEO roles. The hybride ice cream/yogurt pumped by Tasti D-Lite is smooth and creamy thanks to multiple gums and thickeners, but most people only care about the relatively low calories versus full fat ice cream.

I understand the strategic benefit for Tasti D-Lite: they can distribute their frozen yogurt through the 100+ existing Planet Smoothie locations, the customer base has a lot of crossover, smoothie recipes can incorporate frozen yogurt, and hopefully per-unit increase sales will increase more than 25%.

It looks like the preferred transition option for franchisees is to allow units to co-brand the concept. I’m sure the Planet Smoothie franchise agreement was favorable for Amos. My guess is there is a clause whereby existing franchisees have to at least transition to selling the yogurt menu quite soon, but conversions to dual-branded units probably can’t be forced until the franchise agreement is up for renewal.

I hate to say this but I think the acquisition, all things considered, is probably good for Tasti D-Lite. I haven’t seen a concept work where frozen yogurt was a secondary offering, so Planet Smoothie franchisees may be the ones losing some return on their investment following the conversion.

I’m very interested to see how this situation progresses over the next year.

From press releases:

Earlier this year, the first drive-thru Tasti D-Lite location opened in Columbia, Mo., and the first on-campus store was opened at Duke University. In addition, Tasti D-Lite introduced its first self-serve model to the brand’s long-time full-serve model, and also introduced its first “store-within-a-store” location on Las Vegas Boulevard.

“This acquisition presents an opportunity to combine two iconic brands to create a winning combination for both the customer and the franchisee,” Amos said. “The consumer profiles of Tasti D-Lite and Planet Smoothie are very similar, so combining the two complementary brands will provide both brands an opportunity to increase the scale of the combined store network as well as sales at the store level.”

Following this transaction, Tasti D-Lite plans to offer new franchisees the option to own and operate in a co-branded store concept, which fully integrates both brands into a unique customer experience.

The trend has been for franchisors, especially for publicly traded ones, to sell more and more of their corporate owned stores. Why? The financial argument has been that earnings are stabilized by managing a franchise operation (simple income streams) rather than managing the nuances of local operating businesses. And, for the most part that makes sense both financial and practically.

One company who is bucking that trend is Swisher Hygiene, acquired in 2004 for less than $20 million by Steven Berrard and Wayne Huizenga…the team behind AutoNation, Blockbuster and Waste Management. While their business haven’t all been models of success except for AutoNation, they have grown business fast and made a lot of money. Berrard was also CEO of Jamba Juice.

You probably have never heard of Swisher Hygiene. The company sells low cost chemicals and cleaning services to business, especially foodservice and restaurants, such as the 3-compartment sink systems where EcoLab has traditionally dominated. In 2004, it was making an average of $17 per week per customer, with a base of about 30,000 clients. They feel the opportunity in this $9 billion market is in increasing sales to each existing customer and acquiring new ones. Swisher also was an amalgamation of 93 franchisees all working out of their trucks. Now, they acquired most of their franchisees, most recently their Chicago franchisee.

The stock has fluctated greatly in the past year when it went from $2 to $10 per share, now it’s back down to about $5 per share.

I don’t know if they will succeed, but it will make for an interesting case study one day. Hopefully the franchisees who took a buyout with stock will be better off than they were as franchisees.

I apologize for the forum being down for so long. I will install a backup and get it functioning again. There is a lot of great content in there.

On a similar note, I had a new son born a few months ago which has absorbed most of my spare time. I will resume regular posting in mid-August. Thank you for your patience and loyalty.

When a franchisee fails, you don’t often see the franchisor swoop in and take over the lease and operate failed location, but Graeter’s is doing just that in Kentucky. Graeter’s corporate is acquiring several stores like it did for another franchisee back in late 2010.

Sales were reported in a broker’s sheet to be in excess of $3 million for the past three years. The asking price is $2.75 million plus a transfer fee.

Read more: Graeter’s Northern Kentucky franchisee puts stores on the block | Business Courier

For you non-Cincinnatians, Graeter’s ice cream is a local marquee brand in the Ohio Valley.

source: National Restaurant News

1. Washington, D.C.
2. San Francisco
3. New York City
4. Boston
5. San Diego
6. San Jose/South Bay
7. Baltimore
8. Philadelphia
9. Seattle
10. Pittsburgh

I would agree with Washington, D.C. being number 1. I’ve spoken to several small operators, that are expanding to Washington, D.C. One take and bake pizza concept expanded there and within a year it was their best performing store in the system of about 20.

As a rule, franchisees should try to keep their rent 5-9% of gross sales except indoor malls where you’ll be at about 15%. Recently I was evaluating lease rates in the Chicago downtown loop area, and for a nice spot between 1,200-2,000sf you’ll be paying around $50+sf NNN. Compare that to suburbs of Orlando where you’ll easily grab prime shopping center space for $20-25sf with lots of incentives.

I’ve noticed several franchised “Urban Flats Flatbread & Wine Co.” closing this year in the southeast, such as Orlando FL, Winter Park FL, Lawrenceville GA,  and Atlanta GA (pictured to the right).  Something clearly isn’t resonating with potential and repeat customers.   Many franchises suffer from this ‘surprise’ problem leaving execs scratching their heads about what is going wrong.    I’ll put on my pundit hat and give you my opinion and recommendations.

HOW RESTAURANTS ARE JUDGED BY CUSTOMERS:

People will instinctively judge a restaurant on three elements, and to draw repeat business you need to excel in at least two of these (and be at least average in the third) in the eyes of your local customer base:

1. FOOD:  Is the food memorable and superb all around?
2. PRICING: Is the pricing at or below the competition; does it provide value?
3. AMBIANCE/EXPERIENCE:  Is the customer experience superb with a unique and comfortable interior design?

A restaurant could succeed by satisfying only two of three criteria.  For example, you could provide an excellent customer experience and have great food, but prices are too high.   Cheesecake Factory and J. Alexanders are examples of this but both still generate excellent sales.

HOW URBAN FLATS RATES:

According to most of the reviews I’ve read online, Urban Flats rates as follows:

1. FOOD: Average food, flats are minimalistic…not bad but not excellent either
2. PRICING: A bit high – $10 cheeseburger, $8.50 Loaded Potato appetizer, $10 “flats” pizza
3. AMBIANCE/EXPERIENCE: Average, some described it as trying too hard to be cool.   Music is too loud to talk.  If you have to describe your restaurant as hip in advertising, you probably are not.

Other repeat comments are that visitors expected a walk up ordering counter and self seating, but it’s a sit down wine bar.   The menu is surprisingly diverse for a “flats” restaurant.  It showcases very high end salads and entrées ranging from salmon and tandori chicken.  People understandably describe the “flats” as “pizza” even though there is no mention of pizza on the menu.

Also see: Urban Flats Menu

FIXING THE BUSINESS

I could see this concept get on the path to profitability by switching to a limited menu of “flats” priced at the fast casual norm of $6-$8.  And, only selling sides that support the “flats” sales such as  salads.  The service style should be fast (under 5 minutes to receive your order) and be located in storefronts where you’d find fast casual restaurants like Panera Bread, Go Roma, or Noodle & Company.

Ditch the waiters and table service, ditch trying to be a hip bar.  Ditch the menu items that do not support the “flats”, shrink your footprint to under 3,000 square feet. Make the seating comfortable to individuals and groups.  Try to infuse “authenticity” into your brand story, focus on the unique “flats”, don’t fight the pizza comparison.   Hire a new chef consultant (you need outside unbiased help right now) to restructure the menu, and rework foods to get the food costs well under 30%.   Hire an experienced research firm to test and improve the menu (email me if anyone wants research firm recommendations).  Let the chef consultant work closely with the research firm for best results.  Since stores already have bars and liquor licenses, have a couple of low-cost wines and decent draft beers with the pizza, but I’d drop the hard liquor permits if possible and just do beer and wine.  Flipper’s Pizzeria and Go Roma do this successfully while keeping it family friendly.  You may be tempted to go the sports bar route but I wouldn’t recommend it in this instance because you’ll get lost in the shuffle as most sit down pizza places already pseudo try that.

Currently, there is little unique about Urban Flats other than their “flats” pizza.  Luckily, there is a market void for quality under-5-minute pizza restaurants (Red Brick Pizza is currently trying to exploit this niche with high-temp stone hearth ovens that cooks pizza in 3-4 minutes…I’ll do a review of Red Brick Pizza soon because I think they’re screwing up too).   If I owned Urban Flats, I’d bet the farm on branding the restaurant entirely around the “flats”.   Try being more kid friendly with the menu and seating in your suburban locations and you’ll get many more of the coveted large family groups.   Gimme’ a combo that includes a flat, salad or side and drink for $10.

The foundation and sole goal for this turnaround is getting people in the door, returning every week, and encouraging their friends to check it out.  Once customers consistently fill the seats and gross sales are high enough to at least reduce prime costs under 60% and rent under 10%, then owners/managers can pontificate on increasing profitability by increasing average liquor sales, optimizing labor schedules, table turnover times, and getting their friends posh jobs at the bar.

As I write this I’m reminded of the reality show “Kitchen Nightmares” starring Chef Gordon Ramsey.  Ramsay doesn’t come out and say it but his formula for saving restaurants from bankruptcy hinges on fixing the three criteria above.  He (1) reduces the complexity and size of the menu, (2) reduces the prices to encourage repeat business and match competition, and (3) remodels the interior design and employee’s attitudes.

DineEquity, owner of Applebees and IHOP brands, is trying smartly trying to avoid discounting their menu like the rest of industry. Their strategy to get customers in the door focus on appealing healthy “skillets” price at $9+ which currently make up about 10% of sales.

The “2 for $20″ deal of an appetizer and two entrees now makes up 18% of Applebee’s sales mix, down from around 20% in previous quarters, Stewart said. Applebee’s promoted that offer through most of last year but has since made it a mainstay on the menu that’s not supported prominently by ads.Applebee’s margins rose slightly last quarter, to 14.1% to 14%, helped by lower food costs, although that was offset partly by more marketing to try to bring in guests.

Same-store sales were down 1.6% at Applebee’s systemwide, an improvement from prior quarters, while guest counts continued to decline on year.

Average unit sales were $1.4 million per company-owned Jack in the Box location and $900,000 per Qdoba system location in fiscal 2009.

source: Morningstar

Quiznos

• Quiznos renegotiated it’s debt load and took in an infusion of equity capital from JP Morgan and other existing shareholders.   You can read both good and bad into this.  The good being the investors saw enough upside to invest more, the bad being Quiznos desperately needed this to happen so their financial soundness probably isn’t strong.

Chipotle

• Chipotle still showing a growing customer base with 1st quarter same-store sales up 4.3%.  They plan to open a new store every three days in 2010.

Fuddruckers

• Fuddruckers filed for bankruptcy a few weeks ago.   It received approval to sell 62 Fuddruckers and a dozen Koo Koo Roo (similar to Boston Market) for $65 million.  It also plans to close 20 restaurants with “lease issues or low-foot traffic” stores.  Sales were down 10% in 2009.
• I woudn’t consider Fuddruckers part of the “better burger” craze of Five Guys and Counter, the brand is simply too old and retail square footage is way too large.  Red Robin’s are large in size too, but it invested plenty of capital in marketing and bradning to keep its brand appealing to the next generation of customers…much more so than Fuddruckers.

Pizza Fusion

• Plans to offset its entire “carbon footprint” by paying a percentage of sales to a company to construct renewable energy facilities.

As you’ve probably heard, Papa Murphy’s was acquired by a private investment firm for $180 million, about $150,000 per store.  I think it will turn out to be a good acquisition even with the steep price.  Papa Murphy’s has a combination of economic advantages that no other pizza chain has – 1)  it doesn’t have the overhead and capital costs of in-store baking, AND 2)  it is gaining strong penetration in grocery stores.

I admit, from the consumer’s stand point, a take and bake concept is a little confusing at first. “You mean I have to bake my own pizza?”   But that impression soon fades.   The pizza in its raw form looks fresh and the final product cooked in the home oven is as good as pizza delivery.   One hurdle overcome by the industry was the difficulty of using a home oven to cook a pizza because it doesn’t brown up well with the ordinary pizza dough recipe.   To solve this, chains like Papa Murphy’s increase browning by increasing the sugar percentage and providing a disposable reflective baking tray.

Another potential acquisition target is Homemade Pizza, a regional 25 unit chain in IL, MN and DC of classy take-and-bake stores where the average price of an “unbaked” large pizza is almost $20.   It seems to be doing well and has great branding.  Homemade Pizza pizzas are still priced on the high end because it is made with fresh and local ingredients.  The dough is prepared in a commissary to simplify store operations and reduce size requirements.

_______________________________________________________

Update:  Below is more interesting history on Papa Murphy’s from a November 2009 article in Portland Business Journal.  Average store sales are about $535k.

Papa Murphy’s is a holding of Charlesbank’s Equity Fund V, a $590 million private equity fund that holds several other food-related concerns, including Captain D’s Seafood and Del Taco.

Charlesbank teamed with Papa Murphy’s current president, John Barr, and company management, to recapitalize the pizza chain in a deal announced July 7, 2004. As part of the transaction, Wells Fargo Bank provided a revolving line of credit.

Terry Collins formed Papa Murphy’s in 1995 by merging Petaluma, Calif.-based Murphy’s Pizza with Hillsboro-based Papa Aldo’s. Together, the two chains had 140 locations.

By the time it partnered with Charlesbank, Papa Murphy’s had grown to about 800 stores in 24 states.

In late 2009, it has 1,153 locations in 32 states and two Canadian provinces. It has expanded largely by franchising its concept.

The company owns about 50 stores. The balance are operated by a network of more than 450 franchisees

More than half its franchisees own only one or two stores.

Quick service segment 4th quarter average same store sales: -4.7%

• Arby’s: -11% (only down 7.4% in January)
• Wendy’s: -3%
• Sonic:  -13% (blames the heavy snow)
• Carl’s Jr.: -2.6%
• Hardees: -6.2%
• McDonald’s: +.6%

Casual dining segment 4th quarter average same store sales: -4.2%

• Buffalo Wild Wings:  +2.0%
  • fun facts—-Buffalo Wild Wings essentially sells a neighborhood sports bar concept. It features Buffalo style chicken wings, burgers, and other “bar” foods. Takeout represents about 13% of sales. Another 22% of total sales are derived, not surprisingly, from traditional chicken wings. Boneless wings, which have better margins than the regular kind, were 19% of Q4 sales, up from 17% in Q4 2008.
• Famous Daves:  -6.3% for company-owned restaurants and -8.5% for franchise-operated restaurants.
• Morton’s: -11.6%

Fast Casual segment 4th quarter average same store sales: -.08%

• Panera Bread: +7.4%
• Cosi: -11.9%

Pizza segment 4th quarter average same store sales: +1.8%

• Domino’s: +1.8%
• Papa  Murphy’s +2.0%

Family dining segment 4th quarter average same store sales: -2.7%

• Steak n Shake: +14.4%
• Frisch’s Big Boy: -.4%
• Cracker Barrel: -.2%
• Denny’s: -6.1% at corporate owned units, -7.2% at franchised units
• iHOP: -3.1%

Staying on the pizza topic for a moment…..Little Caesar’s and Donatos (both pizza) have a large number of former company executives that have transitioned to franchisees. That is a good sign and both are adding units faster than their counterparts in the industry, each for different reasons (LC for price, D for uniqueness). Little’s Caesars hot-and-ready pizza deals have been a hit with a simultaneous improvement in quality from high speed impingement ovens. Donatos’ pizza is a very unique thin pizza similar to a St. Louis style or Chicago thin style, and it has operations and pizza assembly down quicker than anyone I’ve seen. Surprisingly, Little Caesars makes their own dough while Donatos uses preformed frozen dough that arrives ready to bake on a disc.

Asking a franchisor salesman how many executives or former executives are franchisees is a great question.

I thought Obika, a Fresh Mozzarella Bar concept from Europe, would do fine in the big cities and may ultimately make a good franchise, succeeding by shadowing the locations of Au bon Pain. I assumed their dozen overseas locations would have been prepared a powerful USA launch. But, the NYC location is not earning universal fondness from New Yorkers.

The look is modern and euro, and it has the right formula of escalating a familiar food to a higher level of passion. However, it fails in execution – service is too slow and the sandwiches are simply average. When people are paying a premium ($10 a sandwich), your niche is smaller and there is more pressure to earn repeat business from the local workers. I would imagine they have to do at least 350 transactions per day to break even. Eventually the number of potential new customers will dwindle to unsustainable levels and survival will depend on repeat business. I still think Obika will make it, but the chances of it being a 10+ unit chain in the USA are very slim.

Pizza chain sales are down:

• Pappa Johns: -5.7%
• Pizza Hut: -12.9%
• Dominos: -6.5%
• Sbarro: -6% domestic, -13% internationally (taking into account increase in US dollar)

Sbarro’s attributes a drop in sales to a drop in mall traffic.
What is up?  Frozen pizza sales.

Frozen pizza sales rocketed to $4.4 billion in America last year from $3.1 billion in 2000, the Minneapolis Star Tribune reported this week, citing market research by Datamonitor Inc.  Sales of private-label brands (produced by chains such as Walmart, Jewel, Dominick’s and Target) have risen more than 20 percent in the past year.  Clearly, cost and an acceptable level of quality is at play here.

In related news, Kraft Foods Inc., maker of DiGiorno, Tombstone and Jack’s, said it selling their brands to Nestle so it can fund an acquisition of Cadbury.